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Flashbulb memories are vivid and long-lasting memories for the reception context of an important public
event (Brown & Kulik, 1977). They are assumed to be triggered by emotional factors (i.e., intensity of
emotional feeling, appraisal of the original event) and by social factors (i.e., social sharing of the news,
following media debate about the event). The present study investigated the memory for the death of the
former President of France F. Mitterrand in two social groups, i.e., French and Belgian people. This study
tests whether the flashbulb memory attributes, the memory for the original event, and the impact of the
emotional and social determinants of flashbulb memory differed across groups. The results indicated that
the flashbulb memory for Mitterrand’s death is affected by group provenance, as French people showed
higher levels of recall for the flashbulb memory attributes and their determinants than Belgian people.
Time impaired recollections in both groups, so that flashbulb memories appear prone to decay and share
the same destiny as ordinary memories. The theoretical construct of concern—as the most basic ante-
cedent of emotional experiences and its related appraisal (Frijda, 1994)—is discussed in order to explain
the differences in memory of the two social groups.
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About twenty years ago, Brown and Kulik (1977)
defined flashbulb memories as vivid, detailed, and
long-lasting memories for the circumstances in
which people learned about a shocking public
event (for instance, the assassinations of John F.
Kennedy, Malcolm X, or Martin Luther King).
According to Brown and Kulik, people retain the
memory for the reception context in which they
first heard about the public event. In other words,
people remember vividly and for a long time not
just the original event, but features of the recep-
tion context, such as when they first learned about
the event, where they were, what they were doing
and with whom, the informant, and the aftermath
of the event (Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik,
1977; Conway et al., 1994; Larsen, 1992). Flash-
bulb memory studies are usually for important
public events, although there are some studies
showing that people have very vivid memories
related to personal events (Pillemer, Goldsmith,
Panter, & White, 1988; Rubin & Kozin, 1984).
According to Brown and Kulik (1977), the two
main determinants of flashbulb memories are
surprise and importance–consequentiality of the
original event. If an event triggers both a great
level of surprise and is rated as consequential, it is
supposed to be remembered for a long time. To
illustrate, in the United States, Brown and Kulik
(1977) investigated flashbulb memories of Afri-
can-American and Caucasian participants about
the deaths of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X,
two events for which the level of consequentiality
was substantially different in the two groups con-
sidered. The results showed that African-
American participants had significantly more
flashbulb memories for these events than Cauca-
sian participants (Brown & Kulik, 1977). Brown
and Kulik (1977) explained these results by pos-
tulating a special encoding mechanism in the brain
that is triggered by the original event and that is
assumed to make the memories vivid and long-
lasting (Livingston, 1967). Other authors account
for the special encoding hypothesis by emphasis-
ing the role of surprise, importance–con-
sequentiality, and emotional feeling states in
general (Conway, 1995; Pillemer, 1984).
The special encoding hypothesis has been
criticised by authors stressing the importance of
reconstructive post-encoding factors. Their theo-
retical perspective is also known as constructivist
(Christianson, 1989; McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen,
1988; Neisser, 1982; Wright, 1993). According to
these authors, the rehearsal of the original
experience plays an important role in yielding
flashbulb memories, both in their maintenance
and in their formation. Flashbulb memories are
viewed as not particularly vivid and long-lasting.
Instead, they are still inaccurate and prone to
decay, as rehearsal processes make them con-
tinuously modified. As with any ordinary memo-
ries, these memories get distorted and biased over
time (Christianson, 1989; Schmolck, Buffalo, &
Squire, 2000; Wright, 1993).
Rehearsal encompasses different processes
such as following event-related media debates,
talking about the event with others, and thinking
of the original event. In other words, rehearsal
deals with media communication, social sharing
and rumination about the experience. The con-
structivist approach relies considerably on societal
factors to explain the formation and maintenance
of flashbulb memories (Wright & Gaskell, 1995).
However, this constructivist perspective also
acknowledges the direct impact of emotion, sur-
prise, and importance–consequentiality (i.e., the
encoding variables) as concurrent explanatory
factors that act together with rehearsal in the
formation of flashbulb memories. In this per-
spective, emotion keeps its effect on memory after
the original event has occurred through the social
sharing of and rumination about the event
(Finkenauer et al., 1998). Studies about social
sharing and rumination have shown that these
rehearsal factors are associated with the intensity
of the emotional feeling state felt after an event
(Luminet et al., 2000; Luminet, Zech, Rimé, &
Wagner, 2000; Rimé et al., 1998; Rimé, Philippot,
Boca, & Mesquita, 1992). It follows that emotions
always represent an important determinant of
flashbulb memories. People remember a given
experience for a long time, because they felt
emotionally involved when it happened and
rehearsed it as time passed. Emotion is supposed
to be related both directly and indirectly to
flashbulb memories and to exert its effect both at




Many studies on the formation and maintenance
of flashbulb memories stress the link between
emotion and memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977;
Conway et al., 1994; Pillemer, 1984; Ruiz-Vargas,
1993). An important issue is to explain why people
retain different memories for the same emotional
82 CURCI ET AL.
experience. As proposed by Brown and Kulik
(1977), people are differently affected by an event,
because of the different level of consequentiality
ascribed to it. In the Brown and Kulik study, the
concept of consequentiality is an implementation
of the concept of biological significance proposed
by Livingston (1967). In an evolutionary per-
spective, some events can be more effective for
the survival of the species, others can be less
effective; some events can enhance the safety of
human beings, others can be harmful. People react
differently in consequence of their evaluation of
the potential enhancement or harm carried by an
event. In every context, flashbulb memories arise
when an event is evaluated as highly con-
sequential or, in other terms, as highly significant
for the safety of people living in that context.
Thus, the high degree of consequentiality pro-
motes a different encoding, which leads to a more
vivid and long-lasting memory for the event
(Brown & Kulik, 1977; Guy & Cahill, 1999).
The impact of people’s evaluations in eliciting
emotional experiences has been taken into
account by the cognitive theories of emotion.
Appraisal theorists suggest that emotions are dif-
ferentiated by the cognitive evaluations of the
original event, that is, the so-called appraisals.
These appraisals are automatic processings of a
given stimulus that determine the onset of differ-
entiated subjective feelings (Frijda, 1987; Frijda,
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1984, 1997;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). People appraise the
original event differently, which then gives rise to
different emotional feelings for the same event.
Recently, a new model has been tested which
emphasises the role of cognitive appraisals in eli-
citing flashbulb memories (Finkenauer et al.,
1998). The authors focus on the novelty and
importance–consequentiality appraisals. They
notice that, since Brown and Kulik, the appraisal
of novelty has been neglected by flashbulb mem-
ory scholars. Brown and Kulik (1977) also
assessed the role of consequentiality, even though
they did not clearly discriminate between this
appraisal and the emotion itself. According to
them, flashbulb memories are elicited because
people perceive that the occurring event has some
consequences for their life (Brown & Kulik, 1977).
Finkenauer et al. (1998) tested a model where
novelty is the direct determinant of surprise, while
importance–consequentiality yields emotional
feeling states, and thereby modulates the rehear-
sal of the event. In this model, emotional feeling
states and their cognitive appraisals are struc-
turally linked to yield flashbulb memories. How-
ever, the impact of appraisals and emotion
operate mainly through the rehearsal of the event.
By rehearsing the event, people also maintain the
memory for the reception context (i.e., the flash-
bulb memory attributes) (Finkenauer et al., 1998).
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
FLASHBULB MEMORIES
Besides the approach just outlined relying mainly
on intra-individual processes to explain flashbulb
memories, there is a different perspective stress-
ing the impact of societal factors (Wright & Gas-
kell, 1995). The literature on collective memory
suggests that flashbulb memories are in part the
outcomes of shared experiences happening in
social contexts (Bellelli, 1999; Pennebaker, Paez,
& Rimé, 1997). The social sharing and the
repeated thinking about a public event shape the
content and features of the memory. The more
emotional and important an event is for the social
group, the more likely people will rehearse it
(Finkenauer, Gisle, & Luminet, 1997; Pennebaker
et al., 1997). Thus, people discuss and think about
a public experience in conformity with the inter-
ests and emotional involvement of the group to
which they belong (Jodelet, 1998). In a broader
sense, people discuss and rehearse especially what
is relevant for their country or social group
(Robinson, 1996). Gaskell and Wright (1997) find
in Tajfel’s social identity theory (1981) and in
Turner’s social categorisation theory (1987) the
foundation for the functional analysis of flashbulb
memory with reference to the self-construction
process. According to the social identity theory,
people strive to construct a positive self-concept.
This process encompasses two aspects, their per-
sonal identity and their social identity. The per-
sonal identity is built of cognitions about the
individual herself or himself, while the social
identity is built of cognitions about the groups to
which the individual belongs. Gaskell and Wright
(1997) point out that the memory for political
events contributes to identify each person as an
individual and as a member of a social group.
Memory for political events shapes individuals’
personal and social identity. Therefore, memories
remain vivid and long-lasting, such as flashbulb
memories, ‘‘because they contribute positively to
personal and social identity and thus serve to
maintain or enhance self-esteem’’ (Gaskell &
Wright, 1997, p. 180).
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From these approaches, it becomes clear that
flashbulb memories are not just the outcomes of
an intra-individual remembering process. Rather
they represent truly social experiences and are
shaped by the constraints of the context in which
the original events occur. In others words, flash-
bulb memories should largely depend on the
emotion experienced by social groups. As pre-
viously shown, rehearsal is a social process which
contributes to the elaboration and maintenance
of flashbulb memories for a specific public event.
The way rehearsal shapes the memory is two-
fold. First, people share the event and think of it
in different ways, according to their group’s
habits and requirements. Second, the way the
event is shared and ruminated on will also
depend on the availability of mass media infor-
mation and the way TV broadcasts, radio chan-
nels, and newspapers build up the content of
public debates about the news. Again, these
reflect the group’s habits and requirements (Bel-
lelli, 1999; Bellelli, Leone, & Curci, 1998).
OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The first aim of the present study is to investi-
gate flashbulb memories among two social
groups. No model about the formation and
maintenance of flashbulb memories is being
tested, although we bear in mind that these
memories correspond to a well assessed pattern
of remembering and it is accounted for by some
specific encoding and rehearsal variables (Bel-
lelli, 1999; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al.,
1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998). As the literature
suggests, we define flashbulb memories with
reference to so-called canonical categories of the
reception context, including time, location, other
people present, details of the reception context,
ongoing activity, and changes in ongoing activity
(Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway
et al., 1994; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). We focus
also on the changes in ongoing activity because
they are indicative of the disruptiveness of the
situation with respect to the ordinary scripts of
daily life. In fact, previous research work
(Bohannon, 1988; Winograd & Killinger, 1983;
Wright & Gaskell, 1992) suggested that the
memorability of some events could be partially
due to the changes these events prompt in the
course of ordinary life.
The original event of the present study was the
death of the former French President, François
Mitterrand, on January 8, 1996.1 Mitterrand was
an important politician and he was very familiar to
French citizens. Born in 1916, he became a min-
ister immediately after the end of World War II.
Leader of the Left since the beginning of the
1970s, Mitterrand was elected as President of
France in 1981. He was the first Socialist President
in that country since the 1950s. He was then re-
elected in 1988 and terminated his mandate in
1995, only a few months before he died. He had
then been the President of France for 14 years.
Although F. Mitterrand suffered from prostate
cancer for a couple of years and his cancer was in
its terminal state, his death came as a big surprise
to French people. This was reflected in the enor-
mous amount of news coverage following his
death. French citizens felt very upset by this event,
independent of their personal opinion about
Mitterrand’s politics.
The memory for Mitterrand’s death was
examined in two French-speaking groups, of
French and Belgian citizens, at two different
times, one at 2 months after the event and the
other 1 year later. The present study aimed to
examine more systematically how flashbulb
memories vary across different social groups.
Specifically, flashbulb memory attributes, con-
fidence in flashbulb memory, memory for the
original event, emotional determinants, rehearsal,
and previous knowledge about Mitterrand among
French and Belgian citizens were compared.
Mitterrand’s politics were a very relevant
matter for French society. French citizens directly
experienced the effects of Mitterrand’s politics,
and they had been directly concerned by his
political choices. For Belgian citizens, Mitter-
rand’s politics were only a foreign matter with
much less effect on their societal life. We expected
that the memory for the original event would vary
across the land of origin of the groups, at both
times of measurement. We also hypothesised that
the memory for the reception context would vary
across groups, in that French citizens would
remember the features of the context in which
they learned about the event better than Belgians.
1 Generally, the literature about flashbulb memories deals
with unexpected and shocking public events. It has been argued
that people can also retain photographic memories for expec-
ted events (Neisser, 1982). However the literature rarely
addresses theoretical and empirical differences between auto-
biographical memories for expected and unexpected events.
The present study attempts to examine whether the char-
acteristics of flashbulb memories for an unexpected event hold
for the memory for an expected event.
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In other words, French citizens were expected to
experience more detailed flashbulb memories for
Mitterrand’s death than Belgians did. Confidence
is generally considered among the distinctive
features of flashbulb memories, because people
usually feel very confident about their answers
when questioned about this kind of memory.
Confidence contributes so noticeably to support
the recollection of relevant public events, that it
was even supposed to have some effects on the
development of flashbulb memories (Bellelli,
1999; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Thus, we expected
that French citizens would be more confident
about their recollections than Belgians.
Although the event is appraised on the same
dimensions, the extent to which the cognitive
appraisals are experienced may differ across
groups. In other words, we expected the same
appraisal dimensions (i.e., novelty and impor-
tance–consequentiality) to have an impact, but we
expected them to have a stronger impact in the
French than in the Belgian group.
Similarly to cognitive appraisals, we expected
that the original news would yield the same pat-
tern of negative emotional feeling states in the two
groups. We hypothesised, however, that the
intensity of the emotion would be greater for the
French group than for the Belgian group. We also
predicted that each group would rehearse the
experience to a different degree, depending on
their emotional involvement (Pennebaker et al.,
1997). More precisely, the rehearsal would be
more repetitive for French than for Belgians,
given the direct relationship between emotion and
rehearsal of the event in the structural models of
formation and maintenance of flashbulb mem-
ories (Finkenauer et al., 1998). In the present
study the measure of the rehearsal of the original
event comes from three variables, including social
sharing, rehearsal through the media, and mental
rumination. Furthermore, social sharing encom-
passes global conversations about the original
event, sharing specific facts of the original event,
sharing emotional reactions, and sharing infor-
mation about the reception context. We expected
that the difference between French and Belgians
would be slightly higher for sharing emotional
reactions because of the greater emotional invol-
vement of French citizens in the event.
Finally, the more people evaluate Mitter-
rand’s politics as a prominent topic, the more
they are interested in it, and the more they
should know about it. Therefore we hypothe-
sised that prior knowledge and interest in Mit-
terrand and his politics would be stronger for the
French group than for the Belgian group, but we
did not expect that the French would be globally
more favourable towards Mitterrand than the
Belgians.
The second aim of the study was to examine
consistency of memory across time, as data col-
lection at two different points in time allowed us
to examine this question. Flashbulb memories
were originally considered as long-lasting memo-
ries that remain vivid and detailed over time
(Brown & Kulik, 1977). According to Pillemer
(1998), the public impact of a news item and the
media sensationalism contribute to the main-
tenance and consistency of some memories for
public events. Christianson and Engelberg (1999)
argued that the consistency of flashbulb memories
is related to the degree of involvement and
importance people experience for a given event.
Based on these findings, we predicted that the
consistency of the flashbulb attributes and the
memory for the event would be higher for French
citizens than for Belgians.
Despite the confidence people usually exhibit,
flashbulb memories are not immune to forgetting
(Christianson, 1989; Christianson & Engelberg,
1999; Weaver, 1993). Time has been found to
decrease the accuracy of flashbulb attributes,
while the ‘‘memory for the central event is
enhanced by the impressiveness of the news’’
(Larsen, 1992, p. 61). As a consequence, time is
expected to impair the memory for flashbulb
attributes but not the memory for the event and
the level of related confidence. We examined the
impact of time on the ratings of emotion and
importance, and expected that they would remain
stable over time, because these estimates may
depend on the perceived quality of the related
memories (Christianson & Engelberg, 1999;
Neisser, 1982). Similarly, we examined the impact
of time on the other encoding factors (i.e., surprise
and novelty) and on the variables corresponding
to the ratings of social sharing, rehearsal by the
media, rumination, and personal knowledge about
Mitterrand.
Finally, in line with the idea that flashbulb
memory does not imply the existence of a special
memory mechanism (see Christianson, 1989;
Conway, 1995; McCloskey et al., 1988) we pre-
dicted that, as with ordinary memories, flashbulb
memories would decrease over time in a similar
way for both the groups. Thus, no interaction
effects of time by provenance were predicted on
the flashbulb attributes and the memory for the
FLASHBULB MEMORIES IN SOCIAL GROUPS 85
event scores. Similarly, we did not expect any




Participants were French-speaking French and
Belgian citizens. The independent variables were
the provenance of the participants (i.e., French vs
Belgian), and the phase of the data collection (i.e.,
the test–retest factor). We tested the memory of
participants twice: (1) 1–2 months after Mitter-
rand’s death, and (2) 1 year after the first data
collection. The dependent variables are the
measures of the flashbulb memory attributes.
These attributes correspond to the canonical
categories usually defining flashbulb memories,
such as time, location, other people present,
details of the reception context, ongoing activity,
changes in ongoing activity, and other reception
context details (Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik,
1977; Conway et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998;
Neisser & Harsch, 1992). We also considered as
dependent variables measures of the memory for
the original event (i.e., Mitterrand’s death) and
factors that are supposed to affect the flashbulb
memory formation, such as the appraisals of
novelty and importance–consequentiality, sur-
prise, negative emotional feeling state, and
rehearsal (Finkenauer et al., 1998).
Participants
A total of 362 French participants (54.7% of the
total sample, M age = 29.4; SD = 12.3) and 302
Belgian participants (45.3% of the total sample,
M age = 35.4; SD = 14.7) volunteered to partici-
pate in a study on memories and reactions
related to Mitterrand’s death. The first data col-
lection took part 1–2 months after that event.
One year after the first data collection, 34.5% of
the participants (N = 229), completed the ques-
tionnaire a second time. A total of 124 partici-
pants of the retest-group (54.1%) were French
(M age = 28.4; SD = 11.2), and 105 (45.8%) were
Belgians (M age = 34.5; SD = 14.2). In the
present paper, we will only consider those parti-
cipants who took part in both data collections
(i.e., N = 229 participants). Table 1 reports the
characteristics of the sample, including gender
frequencies.
Measures
The questionnaire is very similar to the one used
by Finkenauer et al. (1998). One difference,
however, is that it aimed at investigating the
impact of surprise more closely by using a larger
set of items. Some questions were also added
concerning rumination on the experience and
prior knowledge about Mitterrand and his politics.
The questionnaire was composed of different sets
of items: (1) flashbulb memory attributes, (2)
confidence about the flashbulb memory attri-
butes, (3) memory for the original event, (4)
negative emotional feeling state, (5) surprise, (6)
appraisal of novelty, (7) appraisal of importance,
(8) rehearsal and rumination, (9) prior knowledge,
(10) personal interest, and (11) attitudes.
1. Flashbulb memory attributes. The flashbulb
memory measures investigated the recall of the
circumstances in which participants first learned
about the event. The questions dealt with the
exact time participants heard the news (date, day
of week, and hour), the source of information
(family, friends, colleagues, media), the place they
were (country, city, room, or other kind of loca-
tion, i.e. in the car), the other people they were
with, their ongoing activity, and the degree of
changes in their ongoing activity following the
announcement. These questions correspond to the
canonical categories of flashbulb memories
(Bohannon, 1988; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway
et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998).
For all the questions, answers scored 1 when
mentioned, 0 when missing. For the date question,
the answer scored 2 when it included the year, the
month, and the day the respondent heard about
the news. It scored 1 when it included only the
year and the month, and 0 when no answer was
TABLE 1
Sample characteristics as a function of group, gender, and
time of data collection
Groups
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provided. For the hour question, the answer
scored 2 when an hour was mentioned, 1 when
only the part of the day was mentioned, and 0
when no answer was provided.
Respondents were asked to list additional
details (with a maximum of 5) of the personal
reception context in which they first heard the
news. In order to rule out details just inferred on
the basis of participants’ familiarity with the
environment, each listed detail was scored 1 if it
met one of the following criteria, 0 otherwise. The
criteria used to score details were: (1) to include a
changeable aspect of the environment (e.g., ‘‘it
was raining’’ = 1; ‘‘a green carpet in living room’’ =
0); (2) to refer to the respondent him/herself or
his/her position in the environment (e.g., ‘‘I was
sitting on a chair near to the radio’’) (see also
Finkenauer et al., 1998).
The variable assessing the source of information
was not included among the flashbulb indicators as
a ceiling effect was found for its distribution, that is,
almost everybody remembered how she/he heard
the news. We therefore collapsed the other six
indicators into a single measure of flashbulb
memory attributes (see later).
Consistency scores were also computed for the
time, location, ongoing activity, other people
present, details, and changes in ongoing activity
measures. For each item, the responses at the first
data collection and at the retest were compared.
The value 2 was assigned if respondents provided
exactly the same answer at the first data collection
and at retest. The value 1 was assigned if the
answers were substantially but not entirely iden-
tical, and 0 if the answers were totally different or
missing at the retest.
2. Confidence. For each of the flashbulb
memory attributes, participants rated the degree
of confidence about their recollection on 7-point
scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
3. Memory for the original event. The memory
for the event was assessed by three items con-
cerning the exact time of the Mitterrand’s death
(date, day of week, and hour), the place where it
happened, and the cause of death. Each answer to
this set of questions was scored 2 if it was com-
pletely right, 1 if it was basically but not entirely
correct (e.g. the answer about the cause of the
death scored 2 for ‘‘prostate cancer’’, 1 for ‘‘can-
cer’’, 0 if it was wrong or missing).
Consistency scores were also computed for
these measures. For each item the responses at the
first data collection and at retest were compared: 2
was assigned if respondents provided exactly the
same answer at both times of measurement, no
matter whether this answer was right or wrong; 1
was assigned if the answers were substantially but
not entirely identical, no matter whether they
were right or wrong; 0 was assigned if the answers
were totally different or missing at the retest.
4. Negative emotional feeling state. This com-
ponent was assessed by asking respondents to rate
on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
the extent to which they were upset by the news.
Additionally, participants rated on three 7-point
scales the impact of the news by assessing how
much they felt (1) shaken (1 = not shaken at all; 7
= very shaken), (2) affected (1 = not affected at all;
7 = very affected), and (3) indifferent (1 = not
indifferent at all; 7 = very indifferent). This last
scale was inverted. Finally, respondents rated on
7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) the
degree to which they experienced eight basic
negative emotions (anger, sadness, guilt, fear,
anxiety, disgust, contempt, and shame).
5. Surprise. Respondents rated on five 7-point
scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) to what extent
they had experienced the news as (1) surprising,
(2) expected, (3) foreseeable, (4) unbelieveable,
and (5) astonishing. The items corresponding to
the labels ‘‘expected’’ and ‘‘foreseeable’’ were
inverted.
6. Appraisal of novelty. Respondents rated on
eight 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much)
how (1) usual, (2) common, (3) current, (4) habi-
tual, (5) unusual, (6) special, (7) uncommon, and
(8) unique the event was for them. The items
corresponding to the labels ‘‘usual’’, ‘‘common’’,
‘‘current’’, and ‘‘habitual’’ were inverted.
7. Appraisal of importance–consequentiality.
Respondents rated the extent to which the event
was important for themselves and their life on a 7-
point scale (1 = not important at all, 7 = very
important). Additionally, they rated to extent to
which the original event had consequences for
them on a 7-point scale (1 = no consequences at
all, 7 = many consequences).
8. Rehearsal. Ten items assessed overt
rehearsal. First, six items assessed the social
sharing of the event with others. One item con-
cerned the global frequency of conversations
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about the original event. The next three items
assessed the extent to which conversations con-
cerned (1) specific facts about the original event,
(2) personal reactions and feelings related to the
event, and (3) information about the reception
context. These items were all rated from 1 (never)
to 5 (very often). Also participants indicated the
number of people they shared the event with (1 =
nobody, 6 = more than six persons), and the time
elapsed until they shared for the first time on a 6-
point scale (1 = immediately after, 6 = never).
These items, except the one measuring the delay
in sharing, were used to assess the social sharing of
the experience. Second, three items referred to
the frequency of rehearsal by the media. Partici-
pants rated how often they had followed the news
(1) on TV, (2) on the radio, and (3) in the news-
papers (1 = never, 5 = more than 10 times).
Finally, the frequency of rumination was assessed
by one item. Respondents rated on a 5-point scale
(1 = never; 5 = more than six times) how many
times they had had spontaneous thoughts or
images about the event during the days following
the event.
9. Prior knowledge. Respondents were ques-
tioned about the exact date of Mitterrand’s elec-
tion, the names of his seven Prime Ministers, and
the years he was a candidate for the presidency.
Specifically, with reference to the election date,
participants were asked to indicate the exact day,
month, and year Mitterrand became President of
France. For each part of the date, the answers
scored 1 when people remembered exactly, and 0
when the answers were incorrect or missing. The
scores for this question ranged from 0 to 3. With
reference to the question about the seven Prime
Ministers, each correctly reported name scored 1,
so the scores for this question ranged from 0 to 7.
For the previous candidatures question, three
years were listed and respondents had to indicate
whether or not Mitterrand ran for the presidency
in each of these years. Thus, the scores for this
question ranged from 0 to 3.
10. Personal interest. Respondents rated their
personal interest in French politics, and the extent
to which they usually follow TV programmes and
newspaper articles about French politics on three
7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
11. Attitudes. Participants rated on three 7-
point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to what
extent they (1) had sympathy for Mitterrand, (2)
admired him, and (3) were favourable to his
politics.
Procedure
Questionnaires were distributed to the partici-
pants 1–2 months after Mitterrand’s death and
again 1 year after the first data collection. Ques-
tionnaires distributed at the retest were identical
to those distributed at the first data collection.
Respondents were asked to recall their experience
and to evaluate their emotional states and the
related appraisals when the event took place. For
the rehearsal measures, they were asked to give an
estimate of the extent to which they shared and
ruminated about the event in the weeks that
immediately followed it. Finally, general measures
of interest, attitudes, and knowledge about Mit-
terrand’s politics were collected again.
Respondents were recruited among under-
graduate psychology students, researchers from
psychology departments, and experimenters’
acquaintances. A preliminary short text explained
that the questionnaire dealt with memories and
personal reactions towards Mitterrand’s death.
Participants were told that there were no right and
wrong answers to any of the questions, the study
being concerned with the memory for mass media
events.
Statistical analysis
In a first step, descriptive analyses were run on the
measures corresponding to the memory for the
original event, flashbulb memory attributes, and
memory consistency. In a second step, measure-
ment issues were considered for all variables used
in the present study. Finally, structural analyses
were carried through mixed-design analyses of
variance models.
To deal with the measurement issue and in
order to summarise each of the listed sets of
indicators in single composite scores, principal
components analyses of mixed measurement level
data were performed by means of SPSS
PRINCALS2 routine. PRINCALS is an optimal
scaling procedure (Young, 1981) aimed at looking
for new scales as closely correlated as possible to a
set of observed scores (Greenacre, 1993). This
2 Principal non-linear component analysis by means of
alternating least squares.
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procedure was chosen because it allowed us to
deal at the same time with nominal, ordinal, and
numerical variables (Van de Geer, 1993; Young,
1981; Young, Takane, & De Leeuw, 1978). For
instance, the variable assessing changes in ongoing
activities is a nominal one with two levels (0 = no
answer and 1 = mentioned activity), while the
emotion indicators are numerical variables rang-
ing from 1 to 7. For the purpose of consistency, we
applied the same procedure to all variables in the
questionnaire, even in the case of variables for
which we had to summarise only numerical indi-
cators to obtain a single composite measure.
Separate analyses were run on each set of
indicators, and, for each set, only the solutions of
unidimensional analyses were retained. We made
this choice for two reasons. First, our purpose was
to aggregate the observed data in synthetical
measures. Second, for each set of variables, we
found that the unidimensional solution was
already a good approximation of the observed
data.
The eigenvalues listed in Table 2 are measures
of fit (contribution to the inertia) of the uni-
dimensional solutions. Eigenvalues range from 0
to 1, where 0 means no fit and 1 the best possible
fit. A fit of 1 means that the items considered are
perfectly correlated and can be replaced by a
single composite score (Greenacre, 1993, 1994). If
an eigenvalue is 1, the composite score resulting
from the scaling procedure is a perfect combina-
tion of the corresponding set of indicators. In as
much as an eigenvalue is lower than 1, as Table 2
shows, the scaling is a slightly imperfect combi-
nation of the corresponding set of indicators in the
analysis (Van de Geer, 1993). For each set of
variables, we checked whether the contribution of
the second dimension to the inertia of the solu-
tions was more or less redundant with respect to
the first one. For all sets this never happened, and
only the unidimensional solutions were con-
sidered.
PRINCALS starts from the contingency matrix
of the raw data which contains the frequencies of
the observation categories for each variable in the
set (Greenacre, 1984; Weller & Romney, 1990).
Optimal scores are mathematically equivalent to
the correlations of the observed scores to the
dimensional solutions and they are related to the
observed frequency of the categories of the vari-
ables (Greenacre, 1993). Comparable to ordinary
correlation coefficients, optimal scores can be
positive or negative in conformity with the direc-
tion of the correlation of the corresponding
observed scores with the dimensional solution.
For each set of indicators, an optimal score is
associated to each respondent. To illustrate, a
positive optimal score obtained by a respondent
on the flashbulb memory attributes means that
this respondent has a better memory than a
respondent achieving a negative score. A negative
optimal score on emotion means that the respon-
dent experienced a lower emotional state than a
respondent scoring positively on that variable.
The saved optimal scores resulting from the ana-
lyses were used as the final measures for each set
of variables. For rumination, we directly entered
the raw scores in subsequent analyses, because
only one item was used in the questionnaire to
assess respondents’ rumination about their
experience.
The subsequent analyses were performed in
order to test whether flashbulb memory attributes
that referred to Mitterrand’s death and their
encoding and rehearsal determinants were affec-
ted by the provenance of the subgroups and by
changes over time. The optimal scores for each set
of variables were first analysed in a 2 £ 2 mixed-
design analysis of variance, where provenance
(i.e., French vs Belgians) was the between-
subjects factor, and test–retest was the within-
subject factor (i.e., 1–2 months after the event vs
13–14 months after the event). Then, optimal
scores resulting from the consistency measures




Flashbulb memory attributes .500
Confidence .466
Memory for the original event .450
Flashbulb memory consistency .421
Memory for the original event consistency .412




Rehearsal (social sharing) .519




Eigenvalues are measures of fit (contribution to the inertia)
of the unidimensional solutions. Eigenvalues range from 0 to 1,
where 0 means no fit and 1 the best possible fit. A fit of 1 means
that the items considered are perfectly correlated and can be
replaced by a single composite score (Greenacre, 1993, 1994).
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of variance, where provenance (i.e., French vs
Belgians) was the independent variable. Respon-
dents’ gender and age were included as covariates
in all comparisons, as the two groups of French
and Belgian respondents appeared different with
respect to these characteristics. The correspond-
ing effects are reported only if significant. Other-
wise, the covariates were dropped from the
analysis and only the main effects and interaction
effects were considered.
Given the high number of multiple compar-
isons on the scores and in order to reduce the
possibility of type I errors, we used Bonferroni’s
adjustment by setting the significance level at
value of p = .001.3 As a consequence, comparisons
significant at p >.001 level were not considered.




Figure 1 shows the percentages of participants
who were able to answer the questions about
memory for the original event. These percentages
are very high (about 94% of respondents) for
memory for the cause of Mitterrand’s death, both
at the first data collection and at the retest. Figure
1 also shows the percentages of people answering
the questions on the flashbulb memory attributes.
For all attributes, percentages exceed 60% of
respondents both at the first data collection and at
the retest.
Consistency scores were computed for memory
for the original event and for the flashbulb mem-
ory attributes. As Figure 2 shows, percentages are
very high especially for memory for the time and
cause of the event (respectively, 72.3% and 88.6%
of respondents), and for the flashbulb memory
attributes of time, place, and other people present
(respectively, 74.2%, 97.4%, and 68.6% of
respondents).
Taken together, these results indicate that, in
general, a high number of respondents retained at
least some details of the event and flashbulb
memory attributes. Furthermore, many memory
attributes showed temporal consistency. As a
consequence, the following step was to check
whether these memory attributes and the impact of
the encoding and rehearsal variables would differ
with respect to the provenance of the groups.
3 Bonferroni’s adjustment led to the threshold of p = .003, as the significance level of .05 is divided by the number of the multiple
comparisons on the PRINCALS scores (i.e. 13 + 2, see Tables 3 and 4). Nevertheless we preferred to use a more conservative
approach and we lowered the p level to .001.
Figure 1. Percentages of responses for memory for the original event and for flashbulb memory attributes.
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Analyses of emotional feeling state
A MANOVA was run on the emotional feeling
state raw scores, with type of emotion (eight levels)
and test–retest factor (two levels) as within-subject
factors and provenance (two levels) as between-
subjects factor. Figure 3 provides a visual display of
the main effect of the type of emotion on the
intensity of the emotional feeling state, both for the
first data collection and the retest, F (7, 1449) =
66.31, p < .001. Neither provenance nor test–retest
effects were found on the negative emotional
feeling states. In other words, French and Belgians’
emotional feelings about the death of Mitterrand
were really close and did not differ over time.
Finally, all interactions were non significant—
except for the interaction effect of provenance by
type of emotion, F(7, 1449) = 4.27, p < .001. Sadness
was the most intense emotion felt by participants,
both at the first data collection and at the retest,
and French were more affected by this emotional
state than Belgians, F (1, 207) = 6.24, p < .02.
Figure 2. Percentages of consistency scores for memory for the original event and for flashbulb memory attributes.
Figure 3. Negative emotional states as a function of group provenance and time of data collection.
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Analyses by provenance
Flashbulb memory attributes, confidence, and
memory for the event. Table 3 shows the results
from the analyses on the PRINCALS optimal
scores. As can be seen, the provenance of the
subgroups had an effect on a large number of the
dependent variables investigated.
Figure 4 displays the mean differences between
French and Belgian respondents for all PRIN-
CALS scores entered in the MANOVAs. Mean
differences for flashbulb memory attributes,
memory for the original event, and confidence
were significantly higher for French respondents.
Thus, confirming our predictions, the flashbulb
memory attributes were better remembered by
the French group than by the Belgians. As
expected, the former group was also more con-
fident about its recollections and exhibited a bet-
ter memory for the original event.
Emotion, surprise, and appraisal of novelty and
importance. As Figure 4 shows, the highest mean
differences between French and Belgian respon-
dents were found for negative emotional states
and appraisal of importance. As predicted, the
French group, compared to the Belgian group,
was significantly more emotionally involved on
hearing the news, and rated the event as sig-
nificantly more important. However, no sig-
nificant effects were found for surprise, except for
age of the respondents, which was found to posi-
tively influence the respondents’ level of surprise,
­ = .340, t (227) = 5.376, p < .001. Thus, older
people experienced a greater level of surprise on
hearing the news than younger people, but this
effect of age did not interact with provenance. The
difference between French and Belgians was not
found to be significant even after controlling for
the respondents’ age.
Finally, for novelty appraisal the effect of pro-
venance just approached the fixed significance
level, F (1, 222) = 10.30, p = .002, r = .211, with the
French scoring higher on this variable.
Rehearsal, prior knowledge, and attitudes.
French participants shared the experience to a
greater extent than Belgian participants (see also
Figure 4). The sharing scores aggregated different
aspects of the phenomenon, i.e. the global
frequency of conversations about the original
event, the sharing of specific facts about the ori-
ginal event, the sharing of personal reactions
related to the event, and the sharing of informa-
tion about the reception context. The two groups
were expected to differ greatly on the sharing of
personal reactions, because of the greater emo-
tional involvement of French respondents. To
compare across groups each aspect of sharing, a
MANOVA was run separately on the four raw
measures of sharing, with provenance (two levels)
as between-subjects factor and the test–retest
Figure 4. Mean differences between French and Belgian participants for all PRINCALS scores entered in the MANOVAs. Points
represent the differences between the means of the French respondents and the means of the Belgian respondents; vertical lines
depict confidence intervals of the mean differences. A positive mean difference indicates that the French scored higher than the
Belgians on that measure; on the contrary, a negative mean difference indicates that Belgians scored higher than French respondents
on that measure.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































factor (two levels) as within-subject factor. The
results of this MANOVA are shown in Table 4.
The French always had higher scores than the
Belgians on all four measures of sharing, but for
the first measure of sharing (i.e., the frequency of
conversations about the original event) the main
effect of provenance was significant; for the other
three measures the results just approached the
significance level (p µ .006). This indicates that, in
sharing their experience, French respondents did
not seem to prefer certain topics of conversation
over others. In the present study, social sharing
seemed a rather homogeneous phenomenon more
intensely experienced by French people.
A shorter delay elapsed before French partici-
pants spoke about the event as compared to Bel-
gian ones, À2 (5, N = 442) = 17.93, p < .005).
However, rehearsal by the media and mental
rumination about the event were not affected by
the provenance of the group.
Finally, French participants showed better
prior knowledge about Mitterrand and his poli-
tical actions than Belgian participants. Controlling
for respondents’ age, this effect remained sig-
nificant although prior knowledge was found to be
positively related to respondents’ age, ­ = .195, t
(227) = 3.382, p = .001. Contrary to expectations,
Belgians scored higher on personal interest in
French politics than French respondents, even
though there was no significant effect of proven-
ance on this measure and on attitudes towards
Mitterrand.
Analyses by test±retest factor
Flashbulb memory attributes, confidence, and
memory for the event. Memory for the flashbulb
attributes was impaired over time, and, contrary
to expectations, people’s confidence about their
recollections also diminished as time passed. As
predicted, there was no significant effect of the
test–retest factor on memory for the event.
Figure 5 displays the mean differences between
the two data collections for all PRINCALS scores
entered in the MANOVAs. It is evident that
higher differences were found for flashbulb
memory attributes and confidence.
Emotion, surprise, and appraisals of novelty
and importance. The ratings of negative emo-
tional feeling state, surprise, and novelty did not
change over time. Contrasting with these results,
importance assessed at the retest was significantly
higher than when assessed at the first data col-
lection (see also Figure 5). Thus, despite the
impairment of memory for flashbulb attributes
and of feeling of confidence, the encoding factors
traditionally regarded as flashbulb memory pre-
dictors kept their impact stable over time.
Rehearsal, prior knowledge, and attitudes.
The ratings of amount of social sharing about
Mitterrand’s death, delay before the first sharing,
frequency of rehearsal by media, and rumination
remained unchanged with time. In other words,
Figure 5. Mean differences between the two data collections for all PRINCALS scores entered in the MANOVAs. Points represent
the differences between the means at the first data collection and the means at the retest; vertical lines depict confidence intervals of
the mean differences. A positive mean difference indicates that scores from the first data collection were higher than scores at the
retest; on the contrary, a negative mean difference indicates that scores at the retest were higher than scores at the first data collection.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evaluations of the amount of rehearsal were con-
sistent over time, as respondents were questioned
about their sharing and rumination about the
event in the weeks immediately following it, both
at the first data collection and the retest. Prior
knowledge about Mitterrand and his politics was
impaired, while there were no effects of the test–
retest factor on the variables assessing personal
interest and attitudes towards Mitterrand. Thus,
the only mean difference between the two data
collections found to be significant was that for
prior knowledge scores (see Figure 5), while
people’s ratings about the other social determi-
nants of flashbulb memories were not affected by
time. No interaction effect of provenance by test–
retest factor was found for any of the composite
measures used in the present study.
Analyses of consistency
Finally, two one-way ANOVAs with provenance
(two levels) as the independent factor were run on
the PRINCALS optimal scores for the consistency
measures. Table 5 summarises the results
obtained. The French had higher scores than the
Belgians for memory for the original event con-
sistency, suggesting that this aspect of memory
remained more stable over time for French
people. For the flashbulb memory attributes,
however, the comparison between the groups did
not reach significance level, indicating that the
two groups did not differ on the consistency of
their memories for the reception context.
DISCUSSION
A first aim of the present study was to examine in
more detail how flashbulb memories vary across
social groups. Memory for President Mitterrand’s
death was investigated in two ‘‘national groups’’,
of French and Belgian citizens. Flashbulb memory
attributes, confidence in flashbulb memory,
memory for the original event, emotional deter-
minants, rehearsal, and previous knowledge about
Mitterrand were compared across groups.
The present study focused on the impact of
variables that were assessed as structural features
of flashbulb memory by previous studies (Finke-
nauer et al., 1998). The theoretical variables
involved in the formation and maintenance of
flashbulb memory were measured by nominal and
numerical indicators, and the PRINCALS
approach was chosen for aggregation purposes.
This approach allowed us to summarise all mea-
sures in composite variables and to compare these
variables across groups.
Flashbulb memories for expected
events
The present study found high percentages of
people answering the questions about the cano-
nical categories of the reception context. The fact
that the death of Mitterrand was expected because
of his serious illness did not seem to make a dif-
ference to the frequencies of these answers. In
other words, recollection may score highly on
flashbulb memory attributes, even if the eliciting
event does not strictly have all the characteristics
required by the flashbulb memory literature
(Brown & Kulik, 1977).
The research on flashbulb memories has gen-
erally dealt with unexpected events. Yet, as Pil-
lemer suggested (1984), the findings on flashbulb
memories need to be generalised by examining a
variety of everyday memories. Some authors have
already extended the research to expected and
predictable events, such as the death of the Spanish
dictator Francisco Franco, the American attack on
Iraq during the Gulf War, or the resignation of the
Italian judge Antonio Di Pietro (Bellelli, 1999;
Morse, Woodward, & Zweigenhaft, 1993; Neisser,
1982; Ruiz-Vargas, 1993; Weaver, 1993). The
present study represents a new attempt to gen-
eralise the findings on flashbulb memory for
unexpected events to memory for expected events.
Concerns, emotions, and flashbulb
memories
The present study shows that memories for the
original event, flashbulb memory attributes, and
confidence ratings were generally higher for
TABLE 5
One-way analysis of variance on the PRINCALS optimal






























* p < .001
Fr = French group, Be = Belgian group.
96 CURCI ET AL.
French people, whose recollections of the original
event were also more consistent. French people
showed a stronger intensity of emotion, impor-
tance, and social sharing, and had more prior
knowledge about Mitterrand and his politics.
Time decreased the strength of the flashbulb
memory attributes, confidence, and prior knowl-
edge about Mitterrand, but increased the related
importance ratings. Finally, no interaction effect
of provenance by time was found in our data set.
In order to understand these findings, the the-
oretical construct of concerns can be taken into
account. This construct allows us to link the
research on flashbulb memory to research on the
cognitive determinants of emotion (Frijda, 1987;
Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1984, 1997; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985). Concerns are hypothetical con-
structs which are defined as motives or reasons for
striving to reach or maintain a given state
favourable to the individual (Frijda, 1994). In this
sense, they can be viewed as the most basic ante-
cedents of emotional experience: They direct the
cognitive appraisal of the original event, and then
elicit differentiated subjective feeling states. In
other words, an event is appraised as emotionally
relevant and has an emotional impact on the
individual only if it favours or harms the indivi-
dual’s concerns (Frijda, 1994; Frijda et al., 1989).
The effect of concerns is not limited to personal
emotional events. The impact of public events is
determined by the degree to which these events
affect people’s concerns. Appraisals of public
events stem from the attempts people make to
protect or promote their own concerns. Different
social groups might be differently concerned by
the same public event (Ciompi, 1997; Kenwyn &
Crandell, 1984). For instance, the death of a well-
known politician in one country does not concern
people from other countries to the same extent.
People whose political leader dies are likely to
have been more affected by his or her politics, and
are therefore likely to experience the effects of the
leader’s death much more than people of foreign
countries. Although foreign people could
appreciate the relevance of the leader’s politics as
regards international matters, their ratings will
always reflect the outsider’s perspective. People
from different social groups form and maintain
memories for important public events whose
intensity varies as a function of their own group
concerns.
In the present study, we based our predictions
on the assumption that the two national groups of
French and Belgians differ with respect to their
concern in the original event. French citizens were
assumed to have been more concerned by Mit-
terrand’s death because of the direct impact Mit-
terrand’s politics had on them. The differences in
concerns between the two national groups were
hypothesised to account for the different extent to
which the two groups recalled the news and the
different impact of the encoding and rehearsal
determinants of flashbulb memories.
The memory for Mitterrand’s death and the
flashbulb attributes were stronger for the French
participants. As expected, flashbulb memories for
this event were more prominent for the group
more concerned by Mitterrand’s politics. The
French respondents were also more consistent in
their memory for the original event, but, contrary
to expectations, they did not differ from the Bel-
gian respondents with respect to their consistency
for the flashbulb memory attributes. The feeling
of confidence, which is among the main features of
flashbulb memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977;
Neisser & Harsch, 1992), was higher for the
French respondents but decreased over time for
both groups. Time seemed to have weakened the
memory for the flashbulb attributes and people
were aware of their forgetting. Despite the high
level of confidence people exhibited shortly after
the event, flashbulb memories then seemed prone
to decay, thus sharing the same destiny as ordinary
memories.
Flashbulb memory and its emotional
determinants
The fact that the French respondents had a
stronger memory for the original event and the
flashbulb memory attributes at least shortly after
the event enabled us to examine more closely the
impact of the supposed encoding and rehearsal
determinants of flashbulb memory. More specifi-
cally, the present study also aimed to examine
whether there were any differences between the
two groups on the encoding and rehearsal factors
usually related to flashbulb memory.
As expected, and consistent with the assump-
tion that the French respondents were more con-
cerned than the Belgian respondents, the
emotional impact of the news was stronger for the
French group. With respect to the type of emotion
felt after the news, sadness was the most intensely
experienced emotion. French respondents, who
were assumed to be the most concerned, also
experienced the highest level of sadness. Having
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adopted the theoretical perspective about con-
cerns, it follows that concerns should primarily
affect appraisals, which, in turn, determine emo-
tional responses (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989;
Scherer, 1984, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
The present study focused on the novelty and
importance appraisal of the news. Although no
differences were found between the two groups
for novelty, importance was higher for the French
respondents. The absence of difference on novelty
between the two groups can be explained by the
fact that people appraise the novelty of a news
item independently from their own concerns
about it. The appraisal of novelty theoretically
precedes all the other appraisal dimensions
(Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). It can be considered
as a very primary process that merely serves as an
orientation reaction. In this sense, the personal
and social concerns with respect to the news may
only have affected the cognitive appraisal of the
news at a secondary level. For importance, ratings
increased for both groups as time passed. It seems
that the long-term consequences of the death were
more seriously appraised by people. Another
explanation of why importance increases could be
that only after some time are people able to
appreciate the differences that arose after Mit-
terrand died. Some changes in politics could have
been implemented that seem very different, but
people can only evaluate these differences after
one year or more.
Flashbulb memory and its social
determinants
With respect to the social determinants of flash-
bulb memory, the present study showed only a
main effect of provenance on social sharing.
French respondents shared their experience to a
larger extent than Belgian respondents, without
discriminating between factual aspects, emotional
features, or contextual information. Sharing was a
widespread phenomenon that encompassed dif-
ferent aspects. French respondents showed the
highest scores for all four investigated features of
sharing, indicating that their discussions focused
on a large variety of topics. On the contrary,
rumination and rehearsal through the media did
not differ across the provenance of the subgroups
and did not change over time. It could be argued
that French respondents shared the news more
frequently for two reasons. First, they may have
had a greater urge to share the news with others.
Second, their social environment may have invited
more sharing and discussion of the news. There-
fore, the social availability of commentaries about
a public event can be hypothesised to affect the
frequency of social sharing of the news (Bellelli,
1999).
This explanation is also supported by the fact
that French respondents showed better prior
knowledge about Mitterrand and his politics.
Mitterrand was a well-known politician whose
political activities affected French societal life for
many years. French respondents had better
knowledge of Mitterrand than Belgian respon-
dents independent of their attitudes towards him
and their personal interest in French politics.
Information about Mitterrand and his political
activity as more available in the French context.
As a consequence, opportunities for conversations
about him and the consequences of his death may
have increased shortly after the event.
Destiny of flashbulb memory
Finally, the present study also supports the idea
that flashbulb memories are not immune to for-
getting (Christianson, 1989; Christianson &
Engelberg, 1999; Weaver, 1993). They share the
same long-term destiny as ordinary memories. In
other words, these memories are affected by
temporal modifications, as are any ordinary
memories, and as a consequence they are not as
special as some authors have suggested (Brown &
Kulik, 1977; Conway, 1995).
Consistency of the flashbulb attributes for the
French group was not significantly higher than
their consistency for the Belgian group. Flashbulb
memory attributes were impaired over time and
the lack of interaction effects of time by proven-
ance on the flashbulb attributes showed that decay
of memory did not differ across the two groups.
On the contrary, the memory for the original
event remained stable for both groups, but the
French were more consistent than the Belgians
about their remembering. As Larsen suggested
(1992), memory for the event could be enhanced
to some extent by the public importance of the
news. This explanation fits well with the present
study where the most concerned participants
showed the highest consistency on memory for the
event, but time had the same effect on flashbulb
memory attributes as on the ordinary memories.
According to the literature, flashbulb mem-
ories are characterised by the great confidence
98 CURCI ET AL.
people exhibit in their recollections (Brown &
Kulik, 1977). In the present study, however, con-
fidence decreased over time, independent of the
provenance of the respondents. As expected,
negative emotional feeling state, rehearsal of the
experience (i.e., social sharing, following media,
and rumination), and interest and attitudes
towards Mitterrand were not affected by time.
Only importance was higher at the retest. These
results suggest that people are very capable of
remembering their emotions and the emotional
aftermath of an event. Although they may forget
details, they seem to continue to remember
accurately how they felt and how they reacted for
some time (Christianson & Engelberg, 1999).
Some authors have argued that studies based on
recall are highly prone to retrospective bias (Ross,
1989). In the present study, retrospective bias does
not seem to play an important role in distorting
memories for emotional experiences, at least
when the recall interval does not exceed one year.
Thus, the findings of the present study are note-
worthy in that they support to some extent the use
of recall procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study attempted to discriminate the
impact of flashbulb memory attributes and their
encoding and rehearsal determinants in two dif-
ferent national groups. The results partly con-
firmed the hypotheses: French respondents
experienced a stronger memory for the original
event and the Flashbulb memory attributes. They
were more confident about their recollections and
their memories for the original event were also
highly consistent. Their ratings were higher for
both the emotional (i.e., emotional feelings and
importance appraisal) and social determinants
(i.e., social sharing and prior knowledge). Time
did not seem to have any impact on these deter-
minants—except on importance and prior know-
ledge—but it impaired memory for the flashbulb
attributes and confidence ratings across the two
groups.
The results of the present study are also con-
sistent with some of the findings of the model of
flashbulb memory formation developed by Fin-
kenauer et al. (1998). In both studies, the emo-
tional and social determinants of flashbulb
memories had a stronger effect for people
assumed to be the most concerned by the original
news.
Recently, research about this topic has
focused on structural models of formation and
maintenance without any reference to the mean
structure of the interacting factors. The present
findings suggest that flashbulb memory differs
not only qualitatively but also quantitatively as a
function of variables associated with respon-
dents’ provenance. Although further research
still needs to investigate the relationships among
variables in order to explain the complex pheno-
menon of flashbulb memories, studies should
also take the influence of potential moderators
into account, such as personal and social con-
cerns.
Finally, further research should investigate the
direct effects of concerns on memory. Flashbulb
memories decay in a fashion comparable to
ordinary memories. Moreover, they seem to decay
independent of people’s concerns for the original
event. Indeed, forgetting of flashbulb memories
occurred in both national groups. Therefore,
flashbulb memories seem not to be as special as
short-term investigation suggests (Christianson,
1989). Research should directly focus on the
investigation of concerns by including some direct
measures of them (such as those assessed by the
Concern Strength and Concern Relevance ques-
tionnaires; see Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995). In
addition, research should better explore the short-
and long-term relationship between concerns and
memory, with reference to different kind of ori-
ginal events.
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baker, D. Paez, & B. Rimé (Eds.), Collective memory
of political events: Social psychological perspectives
(pp. 191–207). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates Inc.
Finkenauer, C., Luminet, O., Gisle, L., El-Ahmadi, A.,
Van Der Linden, M., & Philippot, P. (1998). Flash-
bulb memories and the underlying mechanism of
their formation: Toward an emotional-integrative
model. Memory & Cognition, 26, 516–531.
Frijda, N.H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and
action tendency. Cognition & Emotion, 1, 115–143.
Frijda, N.H. (1994). Universal antecedents exist, and
are interesting. In P. Ekman & R.J. Davidson (Eds.),
The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp.
155–162). New York: Oxford University Press.
Frijda, N.H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989).
Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional
action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 57, 212–228.
Gaskell, G.D., & Wright, D.B. (1997). Group differ-
ences in memory for a political event. In J.W. Pen-
nebaker, D. Paez, & B. Rimé (Eds.), Collective
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